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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Appellant has misstated the issue on appeal because there has been 
neither an expansion of the dominant estate (i.e. Tract B), nor a connection of the 
Easement to a non-dominant parcel (i.e. Tract C). This misstatement of the issue is 
the result of the Lutheran High School's failure to acknowledge the effect of 
paragraph 7 of the September 9, 2002 Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
whereby the district court ordered that the owners, tenants, subtenants and 
concessionaires of Tract C (the non-dominant parcel) may not use the Easement, 
and that Woodlands IV, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the 
Easement by Tower IV tenants, subtenants and concessionaires.1 
In its argument before the district court, the High School was more accurate in stating 
the issue: "[i]f the parking terrace had been large enough to accommodate all of the needs 
of Tower III, this parking terrace on the eastern side of Tract B, we wouldn't be here 
today." (Transcript of Hearing on Summary Judgment, April 22, 2002, p. 21; R. at 694). 
The accurate issue presented by this appeal is: 
Did the district court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Tract 
B Property Owners where the use of the Easement by the Tract B owners, tenants, 
subtenants and concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests did not 
substantially increase the use of the servient estate beyond that contemplated by 
the parties at the time of the grant in 1983, considering the circumstances attending 
the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be attained. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 
17, f 7, 42 P.3d 379. When the Court reviews a grant of summary judgment, it 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Lovendahl v. Jordan 
School District, 2002 UT 130, f 13, 2002 Utah LEXIS 220; Laney v. Fairview 
City, 2002 UT 79, f 9, 57 P.3d 1007. As such, "we consider only whether [the trial 
court] correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of 
material fact existed." Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, ^  7. The Court views all facts 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Lutheran High School filed its complaint in November 1996 and 
averred that a non-exclusive easement (the "Easement") across the northern 
boundary of its property was being overburdened by the construction of an office 
building (known as Tower III) at the Woodlands Business Park on 700 East in Salt 
Lake County, and by what it averred was the expansion of the dominant parcel 
through the inclusion of additional property into the Woodlands Business Park.2 
At the time the Easement was granted in 1983, the owners of both the dominant 
and the servient parcels contemplated commercial development on their respective 
properties. The High School purchased the servient parcel in 1992, changed the 
use of the property, and averred in its complaint that the Easement posed a safety 
risk to its students. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., and The 
Woodlands Business Park Association, (hereafter collectively referred to as the 
A diagram that was used in the district court for illustrative purposes is attached in the 
Addendum at Tab "A." 
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"Tract B Property Owners") filed their Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment") on or about September 25, 2001. 
The High School thereafter filed its Supplemental Complaint on or about 
February 8, 2002, joining Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, as a defendant. On or 
about March 25, 2002, the High School filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Woodlands IV Holdings joined in the motion papers in support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposition to the High School's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The motions were fully briefed by the parties and submitted 
to the court for decision, accompanied by a request for oral argument. Both 
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler on April 22, 
2002. 
The district court entered its Minute Entry on April 26, 2002 (R. at 656-
660), and thereafter entered its written Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 8, 2002 (R. at 661- 666; Addendum at Tab "B") granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the High School's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. It is from this final order that the High School appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about October 27, 1983, Woodland Investment Company, a 
Utah limited partnership ("Woodland") owned the real property located at 
approximately 4020 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Tract A"). 
(R. at 3, % 9.) 
2. On or about October 27, 1983, Woodlands Associates ("Associates"), 
a joint venture of MHP-Woodlands, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, and SLC-1 
Limited Partnership, a Wisconsin limited partnership, owned the real property 
(hereafter "Tract B") on 700 East, immediately west of Tract A. (R. at 3,110.) 
3. On or about October 27, 1983, Woodland and Associates entered into 
a Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the "1983 Declaration"), 
which was recorded in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on October 
27, 1983, as Entry 3862259, Book 5502, Page 1559.3 (R. at 14-24; Addendum at 
Tab "C") 
4. In the 1983 Declaration, Woodland and Associates granted each other 
reciprocal non-exclusive easements appurtenant to and across their respective 
tracts. (1983 Declaration If 4 (a), (b); R. at 18-19; Addendum at Tab "C") The 
easement that benefits Tract B as the dominant estate, and burdens Tract A as the 
The legal descriptions that were exhibits to the 1983 Declaration were reversed, so an 
Amended Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the "1984 
Declaration") was recorded on June 20, 1984 as Entry No. 3957731, Book 5566, Page 
2146, to correctly set forth the respective parcels. A copy of the 1984 Declaration is at 
R. 188-193. 
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servient estate, is referred to as the "Associates Roadway" in the 1983 Declaration, 
and is referred to herein as the "Easement." 
5. The express grant of the Easement reads in part: 
Woodland [predecessor to Lutheran High School] grants to 
Associates [owners of future Woodlands Business Park] a 
nonexclusive easement appurtenant to and across Tract A 
[High School Property] for the purpose of allowing 
vehicular access between the public streets and any and all 
parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on Tract B 
[Woodlands Business Park], provided, that the foregoing 
right of access shall be limited to use for such purposes and 
to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract B for 
commercial purposes (including, but not limited to, 
reasonable and customary deliveries). The easement granted 
by this subsection (a) shall be limited to the roadway 
described on Exhibit "D" (the "Associates Roadway"). 
In addition to the foregoing, Associates shall have the right 
to elevate or sink the western twenty (20) feet of the 
Associates Roadway in order to align the same with the 
upper and/or lower decks of a parking ramp. . . . 
(1983 Declaration,^ 4(a).) 
6. The 1983 Declaration allows for: (1) the possibility that the zoning for 
Tract B might change over time; (2) a building complex on Tract B (Id. at ^ 2(b)); 
(3) a theater-restaurant on Tract B (Id. at 2(c)); (4) a health club on Tract B (Id. at 
U 2(d)); (5) more than one building on Tract B (Id. at ^ 2(d)); (6) a parking ramp on 
Tract B with upper and lower levels (Id. at ^ 4(a), 4(b)(iii)); and (7) parking areas, 
roadways and lanes on Tract B. (Id. at j^ 4(a).) 
7. Minutes of a November 22, 1983 Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission meeting that took place fewer than 30 days after the Easement was 
granted, confirm that the intention of the owner of Tract B, without any objection 
from the owner of Tract A, was to build retail space and three office towers on 
Tract B of five stories, eight stories and twelve stories in height, plus a four level 
parking structure east of the high rises. (Minutes of Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission, November 22, 1983; R. at 187, Addendum at Tab "D.") 
8. The 1983 Declaration also granted an easement across Tract B to 
provide access to Tract A from 700 East for commercial purposes on Tract A. 
This easement over Tract B to benefit Tract A (the "Woodland Roadway" in the 
1983 Declaration), was restricted to seven (7) feet in height so it would not 
interfere with the parking structure to be built on Tract B. (1983 Declaration, 
114(b); R. at 19.) 
9. The respective easements appurtenant to Tracts A and B were for the 
benefit of the parties and their respective tenants, concessionaires, customers, 
invitees and guests as well as the concessionaires, customers, invitees and guests of 
the tenants and subtenants of the respective parties. (1983 Declaration, ^ 4(d); 
R.at 19.) 
10. The development of the Woodlands Business Park that was intended 
at the time of the 1983 Declaration proceeded; however, instead of three office 
towers measuring five stories, eight stories and twelve stories in height (a total of 
twenty-five (25) stories), the office towers ended up being six stories, eight stories 
and four stories (a total of only eighteen (18) stories). Also, instead of 
concentrating the office tower parking in a single multi-level parking structure, a 
smaller parking structure was built on Tract B east of the office towers, and a 
second parking structure was built several years later on Tract C contiguous to and 
to the north of Tract B. This second parking structure can be accessed from within 
Tract B as well as from 700 East and 3900 South. (Dahistrom Aff, fflf 5-9; R. at 
217, 218; Addendum at Tab "E.") 
11. While Tract B was developed as commercial property as expressly 
contemplated by the 1983 Declaration, Tract A was not. Neither a theater-
restaurant, nor a health club was ever built. Instead, Tract A was sold in 1992 to 
the Lutheran High School Association of the Greater Salt Lake Area, a Utah non-
profit corporation, dba Salt Lake Lutheran High School (the "High School"), 
which built a private high school on the property. (Complaint fflf 1, 12; R. at 2-4.) 
12. Woodlands III Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands III") is a Utah limited 
liability company that owns two of the office towers (Towers II and III) and one 
retail building on Tract B. (Dahistrom Aff. ffl[ 4, 5, 7; R. at 217; Addendum at Tab 
"E.") 
13. JDJ Properties, Inc. ("JDJ") is a Utah corporation that owns the one 
office tower (Tower I) and one retail building on Tract B. (Id. at 3; ffl[ 3, 7; R. at 
217.) 
14. The Woodlands Business Park Association ("Woodlands 
Association") is a Utah corporation that owns the parking structure on Tract B. 
(Id. at P ; R . at 217-218.) 
15. The Woodlands Business Park has four main entrances on 700 East, 
that are the primary routes of most of the tenants and patrons of the Woodlands 
Business Park. (Peacock Aff. % 5; R. at 563; Addendum at Tab "F.") 
16. Tower IV, owned by Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC ("Woodlands 
IV"), is built on Tract C, immediately north of Tract B. The construction of Tower 
IV was commenced in June 2000 and was completed in July 2001. (Supplemental 
Complaint, ^ 3; R. at 402; Peacock Aff. f 3; R. at 563.) 
17. Woodlands IV is a Utah limited liability company and is a distinct 
business entity separate from the other defendants in this lawsuit. (Supplemental 
Complaint f^ 3a; R. at 402; Answer to Supplemental Complaint ^ 3, R. at 407.) 
18. While Tract C was added to the Woodlands Business Park 
Association by virtue of a Sixth Amendment To Declaration Of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions Of The Woodlands Business Park, recorded March 4, 
1996, the parties to the amended CC&R's "acknowledged and agreed that 
?74A?f) ? O 
admission of the Additional Property to the Association in no way permits the use 
of that certain 'Associates Roadway' adjacent to the boundary of the Association 
as defined in [the 1983 Declaration]." (R. at 490; Addendum at Tab "G.") In other 
words, the right to the Easement was expressly withheld when Tract C was added 
to The Woodlands Business Park in 1996. 
19. The Easement is non-exclusive and is also used by Lutheran High 
School students, neighborhood residents, and condominium owners who live in a 
condominium development immediately north of the High School (and the 
Easement). The Easement also provides needed access to fire trucks and 
ambulances. (Peacock Aff. ^ 4; R. at 563.) 
20. Although the 1983 Declaration requires it to do so, the High School 
does not maintain the Easement. The Property Owners in Tract B regularly 
maintain the easement year round, including snow plowing during the winter. 
{Id. at H 6; R. at 564.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An easement may not overburden the servient estate, and to determine 
whether an easement is being overburdened, a court must look back to the grant of 
the easement and determine the parties' intent by considering the circumstances 
attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the object to be attained. 
The Utah courts have been called upon many times to determine the intent of the 
parties at the time the easement was originally granted in order to ascertain what 
current use may be made of the servient estate for the benefit of the dominant 
estate. In Utah, appurtenant easements have been litigated since the nineteenth 
century. See, e.g. Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52 P. 9 (Utah 1898). 
In this instance, the parties who granted these reciprocal appurtenant 
easements across Tracts A and B intended that the Easement across Tract A in 
favor of Tract B was 'for the purpose of allowing vehicular access between the 
public streets and any and all parking areas or roadways and lanes situated on 
Tract B provided, that the foregoing right of access shall be limited to use for such 
purposes and to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract Bfor 
commercial purposes (including, but not limited to, reasonable and customary 
deliveries):' (1983 Declaration, % 4(a).) 
The 1983 Declaration granting the Easement speaks of expansive 
commercial development of Tract B, including a building complex, parking lots, a 
parking ramp with upper and lower decks, roadways, and lanes. The 1983 
Declaration anticipates possible zoning changes and further commercial growth on 
Tract B, including a dinner theater and a health club, neither of which has been 
built. 
The record evidence of the minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission, dated November 22, 1983, fewer than thirty days after the Easement 
was granted, demonstrate that the owner of Tract B, without any objection from the 
owner of the servient parcel (Tract A), intended that the commercial development 
of Tract B would include retail space and three office buildings totaling twenty five 
stories in height, with all of the necessary parking, including a four story parking 
structure. 
The servient estate (Tract A) has not been overburdened, which is the correct 
issue, and the notion that the dominant estate (Tract B) has been expanded is an 
inaccurate one. Although Tract C was added to The Woodlands Business Park, 
this additional property was never granted any right to use the Easement, and the 
district court specifically directed Woodlands IV to take all necessary steps to 
assure that all those associated with Tower IV located on the non-dominant parcel 
do not use the Easement. The order in pertinent part reads: 
The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires 
of Tract C and their customers, invitees and guests, may not 
use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV Holdings, 
LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the 
Easement by the Tower IV tenants, subtenants and 
concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests, 
including notifying them, restricting access as part of the 
lease agreements, and such other steps as may be 
appropriate. 
(Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7; Addendum at Tab "B.") The High 
School does not allege that this part of the district court's order was error, therefore 
no appealable issue is presented with respect to Tower IV. 
This case does not present a case of first impression. When an easement is 
disputed, Utah law requires the courts to examine the intent of the parties at the 
time an easement was granted to determine if an unreasonable burden is currently 
being placed on the servient estate. There is no "Bright Line Rule" that can avoid 
this effort. Furthermore, the High School's "Bright Line Rule" is much more dim 
than the High School represents. 
Existing Utah case law applied to the undisputed facts justifies granting 
summary judgment in favor of Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., 
and The Woodlands Business Park Association, where the use of the Easement is 
consistent with the burden on the servient estate that was intended by the original 
grantor and grantee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO THE EASEMENT WAS FOR 
TRACT B TO BE DEVELOPED COMMERCIALLY 
In 1983, when the prior owners of Tracts A and B granted each other non-
exclusive easements over their respective parcels, each envisioned broad 
commercial development. Tract B was to be developed into retail space and three 
office towers, with all of the necessary parking and roadways to accommodate the 
tenants, concessionaires and their customers. The parking needs for Tract B were 
necessarily commensurate with the amount of square footage developed. See, e.g. 
R. at 577. Tract A, where the High School is now located, was to be developed 
into a dinner theater and a health club. The parties agreed that if a dinner theater 
and a health club were not built within a specified period of time on Tract A, the 
owners of Tract B could build both on Tract B. The High School came on the 
scene nearly a decade later and changed the use of Tract A. Although the High 
School does not have a right to the easement it presently uses over Tract B, the 
Tract B Property Owners have never complained. 
In addition to the express grant of the Easement, the 1983 Declaration 
contains the following references evidencing the parties' intent for the nature of the 
burden to be placed on the servient estate: 
No party shall attempt to obtain or consent to any 
change or variance in zoning of Tract B if such change 
would jeopardize the right of Woodland, its successors and 
assigns, to retain and maintain any sign described in Section 
3 of this Declaration. 
(1983 Declaration, Tj 2(a)(emphasis added).) 
The official name of any building complex located 
on Tract B will contain the word "Woodland" or 
" Woodlands" unless the use of such word is not permitted 
by applicable laws, regulations or ordinances.... 
(Id. at ^ 2(b) (emphasis added).) 
No part of Tract B shall, for a period of twenty-five 
(25) years following the date of this Declaration, be used as 
a Theater-Restaurant; provided, that this restriction shall be 
void if no Theater-Restaurant is operated on Tract A for a 
continuous period of sixty (60) months. . . . 
(Mat 1f2(c).) 
If construction of a Health Club on Tract A is 
commenced before the latter of one (1) year from the date 
of this Declaration or nine (9) months after the 
commencement of construction of the first building on 
Tract B, then for as long as such Health Club is completed 
within a reasonable time and continuously available to the 
Parties with respect to Tract B and all tenants of such Parties 
and all of the personnel of such tenants, at prices 
competitive with or less than those being charged at Health 
Clubs open to the general public, no Health Club will be 
operated on Tract B or directly or indirectly by Associates 
(but not its successors) within a radius of 5/8s of a mile of 
Tract A. 
(Id. at f^ 2(d)(emphasis added).) 
In addition to the foregoing, Associates shall have the right 
to elevate or sink the western twenty (20) feet of the 
Associates Roadway in order to align the same with the 
upper and/or lower decks of a parking ramp. On or 
before November 30, 1984 Woodland agrees to construct a 
paved roadway twenty-five (25) feet wide on the Associates 
Roadway in accordance with good construction practices. 
(Id. at % 4(a)(emphasis added).) 
A parking ramp or any similar structure may be 
constructed on Tract B except over the Woodland 
Roadway, and Associates may route all traffic using the 
Connecting Roadway through such structure on the upper 
and/or the lower deck of any such structure. 
(Id. at % 4(b)(iii)(emphasis added).) 
On November 22, 1983, fewer than thirty days following the 1983 
Declaration, the owner of Tract B presented its development plans to the Salt Lake 
Planning Commission. The Planning Commission minutes read in pertinent part: 
#PL-83-3013- The Woodland Assoc. - 4405 South 700 East-
Office/Commercial Complex - Zone C-2- (Millcreek) 
This project was given conceptual approval previously. 
They have refiled as a PUD to allow a variance in the height 
requirements of the buildings. They are proposing the north 
retail building to be two stories a bank building on the south 
comer of the project. The south office tower will be 5 
stories, the middle one 8 stories, and the tower to the north 
12 stories in height. There will be a multi-level parking 
structure east of the high rises which will be four levels high 
at the highest point. The staff recommended approval 
subject to the conditions on file. 
John Hampshire, representing the applicant, stated all the 
retail facility and the center 8 story tower building will be 
Phase I. The bank could be developed at anytime during the 
first phase. Basically they will construct the plateau and 
plaza level including all the front landscaping as part of the 
first phase. The 5 story tower would be Phase II, and the 12 
story as the last phase. The completion date for the entire 
project being approximately four years. 
There was no one else present for or against the application. 
(R. at 224.) 
The High School contends repeatedly in its brief that but for the additional 
parking structure on Tract C, the third office tower on Tract B would never have 
been approved. Whether or not this was the case, the record before the district 
court does not yield the answer. The correspondence and conditional use 
approvals to which the High School refers make no suggestion that a parking 
structure on Tract C was a condition to construction of Tower III. In fact, the June 
7, 1996 letter from Mark Brenchley to a senior planner at the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission (R. at 577) refers specifically to Tower IV, not Tower III, 
and a letter Mr. Brenchley received from The Planning Commission (R. at 580) 
refers to an office building at 3949 South 700 East, which is the address for Tower 
IV. The High School had six years to conduct its discovery to flesh this out and 
cannot claim that there are inferences to be drawn from these documents in the 
High School's favor when none of these documents make any specific reference to 
a requirement for a parking structure to be built on Tract C before the Planning 
Commission would allow Tower III to be built on Tract B. The original approval 
for Tower III was granted in 1983, along with approval for a four story parking 
structure on Tract B, immediately east of the three high rises. {See R. at 224.) 
Conceptually, the parking structure on Tract B could have been enlarged to its 
originally intended four levels to accommodate the tenants of Tower III and the 
record does not suggest that Tower III was ever precluded from this option. 
In any event, whether the approval of Tower III was ever conditioned on a 
parking structure being built on Tract C is a red herring. The issue is whether the 
commercial development of Tract B has overburdened the servient estate beyond 
what the grantor and grantee intended in 1983. 
II. THE USE OF THE EASEMENT DOES NOT EXCEED WHAT THE 
PARTIES INTENDED 
As it turned out, much less development actually occurred on Tract B than 
was originally envisioned. Instead of retail space, plus three office towers totaling 
twenty-five stories, plus a four story parking structure, plus a health club, plus a 
theater-restaurant, there actually exists retail space, three towers totaling eighteen 
stories and a smaller parking structure. The anticipated health club and theater-
restaurant were never built. 
The volume of traffic and the amount of parking space needed for Tract B is 
quite logically commensurate with the square footage of the office and retail space 
that has been developed on Tract B. (See R. at 577.) Additional parking for Tract 
B tenants, concessionaires and their customers on Tract C does not increase the 
burden placed on the servient estate (Tract A) beyond what would otherwise occur 
had all of the parking for Tract B been built on the dominant parcel as originally 
intended. 
Furthermore, the use of the Easement by the Tract B tenants meets the 
precise language of the grant. The non-exclusive Easement runs west from 900 
East across the High School's property to the eastern edge of Tract B where it 
meets one of the roadways within Tract B. Only after an automobile has entered 
one of the roadways does the driver elect to either proceed to parking lots on Tract 
B, or to parking on Tract C, or perhaps to curbside parking on 700 East. In other 
words, the Easement cannot be used to drive directly to Tract C. Instead, the 
Easement is used, as the 1983 Declaration directs, "for the purpose of allowing 
vehicular access between the public streets and any and all parking areas or 
roadways and lanes situated on Tract B ... for such purposes and to such extent as 
may be customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Woodlands IV developed Tract C immediately to the north of Tract B 
between approximately 1996 and 2001, by building an office building (Tower IV) 
and a parking structure. Tract C is accessed primarily from main entrances on 700 
East or from 3900 South. Although Tract C was added to The Woodlands 
Business Park Association in 1996, any right of Tract C to use the Easement was 
specifically withheld by the Tract B Property Owners. 
Woodlands IV was joined as a defendant in this lawsuit very late in the 
game, after the Tract B Property Owners had filed their motion for summary 
judgment. Woodlands IV joined in the Tract B Property Owners' motion papers 
and, together Woodlands IV and the Tract B Property Owners, immediately 
conceded to the district court that there was no legal precedent that would allow 
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Woodlands IV and the tenants of Tower IV to use the Easement. Accordingly, the 
district court ordered Woodlands IV as follows: 
The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires 
of Tract C and their customers, invitees and guests, may not 
use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV Holdings, 
LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the 
Easement by the Tower IV tenants, subtenants and 
concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests, 
including notifying them, restricting access as part of the 
lease agreements, and such other steps as may be 
appropriate. 
(Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, f 7.) The district court properly 
granted summary judgment because Tower IV tenants were precluded from the 
Easement and the Tract B tenants' use of the Easement is consistent with the intent 
of the parties at the time the Easement was granted. 
III. THE LANGUAGE OF THE EASEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
IN FAVOR OF THE TRACT B PROPERTY OWNERS AND IN 
LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
The correct statement of the relevant Utah law is that in construing 
instruments creating easements in land, the court should construe the instrument 
most strongly against the grantor, and most favorably to the grantee, and should 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties by looking to the 
circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the 
thing granted, and the object to be attained. Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co,, 18 P.2d 292, 
294 (Utah 1933); Wood v. Ashby, 253 P. 2d. 351, 353 (Utah 1952); Wykoffv. 
Barton, 646 P. 2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982). If the provisions of the instrument leave 
some doubt as to their meaning, the court may also look to the practical 
construction placed upon the instrument by the parties. Id. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 is consistent with 
Utah law and supports looking to the 1983 Declaration and to extrinsic evidence 
such as the minutes of the Salt Lake Planning Commission to determine what the 
parties intended in order to carry out that purpose. Section 4.1 of the Restatement 
reads in part: 
A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the 
intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in 
the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of 
the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was 
created. 
The High School is unable to explain why the development plans for Tract B 
revealed in the Planning Commission minutes fewer than 30 days after the 
Easement was granted should not be relied upon to ascertain the parties' intent. 
We know the grantee's intent from the record evidence. In 1983, the developer 
proposed a plan that included retail space, three office towers totaling 25 stories of 
office space, plus a four-level parking structure. We know that this plan was 
approved by the Planning Commission. We also know the grantor's (Captain 
Nemo) intent because he had years to challenge these development plans, as well 
as the actual construction, but failed to do so before he sold the servient estate 
(Tract A) to the High School in 1992. If the grantor of the Easement had opposed 
the development of Tract B, surely the High School would have uncovered some 
evidence of the grantor's opposition during the six years this lawsuit languished in 
the district court. The High School was simply unable to proffer even a scintilla of 
evidence to controvert the Planning Commission minutes that are entirely 
consistent with the 1983 Declaration and its specific references to more than one 
building, a building complex, future zoning changes, parking lots, a parking ramp 
with upper and lower decks, roadways, lanes, and perhaps eventually a health club 
and a theater-restaurant. The very fact that the 1984 Declaration,4 which was 
recorded to correct the reversed legal descriptions for Tracts A and B in the 
original 1983 Declaration, was not otherwise amended, is further evidence that the 
grantor had no objection to the announced development of Tract B and that the 
development was consistent with his intent. 
IV. TRACT B'S PLANNED DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTING USE 
OF THE EASEMENT IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT 
AND SUPPORTED BY CASE LAW 
While overburdening an easement is not permitted, overburdening can only 
occur if the use of the easement substantially increases the use of the servient 
See fn. 3, supra. 
estate beyond that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant. Wood v. 
Ashby, supra, 253 P.2d at 354. 
When an easement grant contains general language without specific limits, 
the easement is construed to mean a general right of way capable of all reasonable 
use. F. T. Chen, Annotation, Extent and Reasonableness of Use of Private Way in 
Exercise of Easement Granted in General Terms, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256, § 2[a] (2001). 
The easement grant at issue here is very broad, its only nominal limitation being 
that it is restricted to the customary use of Tract B for commercial purposes. 
The use that may be made of an easement is not static. When the grant 
contemplates commercial development, the easement should be interpreted to 
allow normal development of the dominant estate. This is the recommendation of 
the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10 which has readily been 
adopted: 
[T]he beneficiary of an easement or profit is entitled to make 
any use of the servient estate that is reasonably necessary for 
the convenient enjoyment of the servitude for its intended 
purpose. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the 
beneficiary's use of the servient estate may change over time 
to take advantage of developments in technology and to 
accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or 
enterprise benefited by the servitude. 
Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein et al, 1X1 A.2d 1232, 1240 (Conn. 1998) 
(citing Restatement (Third) Of Property (Servitudes) § 4.10); Cooper v. Sawyer, 
405 P.2d 394, 401 (Hawaii 1965) ("where the grant of easement is unrestricted (as 
it was here as to the right of ingress and egress) the use of the dominant tenement 
may reasonably be enlarged"); see also, 3 A.L.R.3d 1256 (reasonable use 
encompasses any purpose to which the dominant land may be naturally devoted, 
and the normal and necessary development the owner may choose to make, 
including improvements and modem inventions). 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed this approach in Burke-Tarr 
Company v. Ferland Corporation, 724 A.2d 1014 (R.I. 1999), where the plaintiff 
sought to terminate an easement because the defendant built an apartment complex 
on the dominant estate, where previously there had only been a single cottage. The 
court rejected the claim that the easement was only intended for access to a single 
cottage, saying "a right-of-way will be construed in favor of the grantee, limited 
only by what is reserved expressly in the instrument and the accompanying 
circumstances to demonstrate the intent of the parties." Id. at 1018. The easement 
at issue created an unrestricted grant of access to the property, and the construction 
of a 191-unit apartment complex was an increase in degree, not type of use. Id. at 
1019. 
In the present case, Tract B has been developed commercially, and has 
actually been developed to a lesser degree than was originally intended. 
Allowing Tract B tenants to use the Easement regardless of where their 
parking is located, does not run afoul of the rule recited in the Restatement (Third) 
of Property (Servitudes) § 4.11 which states: 
Unless the terms of the servitude determined under 
§4.1 provide otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit 
may not be used for the benefit of property other than the 
dominant estate. (Emphasis added.) 
While Woodlands IV's use of the easement would admittedly violate this 
principle, the Tract B tenants who might use the right of way to access parking, 
even if that parking is not on the dominant estate, is certainly for the benefit of the 
dominant estate, rather than for the benefit of property other than the dominant 
estate. The grant language u[f]or the purpose of allowing vehicular access 
between the public streets and any and all roadways and lanes situated on Tract 
B" actually accounts for the use currently being made by the Tract B tenants to 
access parking on Tract C, especially when read in the context of the further 
language in the 1983 Declaration which declares the scope of the easement to be 
"to such extent as may be customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes. " 
(1983 Declaration, 1f 4(a).) Read together, the provisions of the 1983 Declaration 
grant access not only to the parking areas on Tract B, but also "to allow vehicular 
access to all roadways and lanes on Tract B as may be customary for use of Tract 
Bfor commercial purposes.1' (Id.) 
V. THE HIGH SCHOOL'S BRIGHT LINE IS REALLY QUITE DIM 
The High School suggests, citing State ex rel Fisher v. McNutt, 597 N.E.2d 
539 (Ohio App. 1992), that there is a "universal rule" that if one acquires a right of 
way through one lot or parcel of land, he or she cannot use it to gain access to that 
parcel and thence over his or her own land to other lands belonging to him or her. 
(Brief of the Appellant, p. 17.) Although the case generally suggests the 
proposition that the High School says it does, it turns out that this is not necessarily 
the rule in Ohio, and it is certainly not a universal rule. When we were before the 
district court, the High School included the same supposed quote referencing a 
"universal rule" in its motion papers. (R. at 423.) We searched for this quote in 
the text of the opinion, all to no avail. We did find, however, that the High School, 
then as now, has blended two separate paragraphs from the appellant's 
Assignments of Error in the Ohio decision's appendix in order to formulate a quote 
supposedly attributable to the court about a "universal rule." We find this 
deceptive, but more importantly, State ex rel. Fisher was subsequently 
distinguished by another Ohio appellate court, which referred to the language 
relied on in State ex rel Fisher as being merely dicta. See, Proffitt v. Plymesser, 
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2801, *4 (June 25, 2001) (not reported in N.E.2d) attached 
at Addendum at Tab "H." The Proffitt court held that an easement may indeed be 
used to access additional property so long as the use does not increase the burden 
to the servient estate. Id. at *4-5. 
In Proffitt v. Plymesser, the owner of the servient estate alleged that the 
owner of the dominant estate had increased his farming operation from seventy 
acres in the original dominant estate to one hundred eighty-five acres and was 
using the easement that had originally been granted for ingress and egress to the 
seventy acres to also access the additional one hundred fifteen acres. Id. at *3. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the use of the easement was proper absent a 
showing that there was any measurable increase in traffic on the right-of-way due 
to traffic accessing acreage beyond the seventy-acre plat. Id. at *4-5. 
Proffitt v. Plymesser is instructive on a number of points. It illustrates that 
the accurate issue is whether the use of the Easement overburdens the servient 
estate, not whether the dominant estate has been expanded. It further illustrates 
that there is no "bright line rule" that can be invoked to avoid litigation. The court 
in Ohio did precisely what a court in Utah must do - it gave effect to the intention 
of the parties at the time of the grant by looking to the circumstances attending the 
transaction, the situation of the parties, the state of the thing granted, and the object 
to be attained. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut took an approach similar to that taken in 
Proffitt v. Plymesser when it addressed a situation where there was a question 
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about using an easement to access a parcel adjacent to the dominant parcel. In 
Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, supra.5 (acknowledged in Reporter's 
Note to Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.11), a Science Center 
held an easement to permit access to its property where it conducted its science 
programs. The Science Center subsequently acquired the use of an adjacent parcel 
of property and constructed a building containing administrative offices, 
classrooms, television studios and a planetarium. The issue was whether the 
easement could be used to gain access to this second piece of property. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on its earlier precedent and the Restatement 
(Third) of the Law of Property (Servitudes), held that while an easement of access 
does not automatically attach to after-acquired property, in some circumstances the 
parties at the time of the creation of an easement may be found to have 
contemplated, as a matter of law, that its benefits might accrue to adjacent property 
that was not formally within the terms of the easement. To determine the intent of 
the parties at the time the easement was granted, a court reasonably may take into 
account the proposed use and the likely development of the dominant estate by 
examining the relevant documents at the time of the original conveyance. 
5
 See also, Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein, 257 Conn. 570; 2001 Conn. 
LEXIS 336 (2001). 
The High School also cites DND Neffson Co. v. Galleria Partners, 745 P.2d 
206 (Ariz. App. 1987) and Perm Bowling Recreation Center v. Hot Shoppes, 1179 
F. 2d 64, 66 (D.C.Cir. 1949), which are inapposite. These cases stand for the 
proposition that patrons from a non-dominant parcel should not have access to the 
easement through the dominant parcel. We agree. However, this proposition does 
not advance the High School's cause.6 The district court's order in our case 
unconditionally prevents Woodlands IV and the patrons of its Tower IV from 
using the Easement. The High School infers that the district court's order will be 
6
 Likewise, the High School cites to McCammon v. Meredith,830 S.W.2d 577, 580 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); McCann v. R. W. Dunteman Co.,609 N.E. 2d 1076 (111. App. Ct. 
1993); McLaughlin v. Bd of Selectmen of Amherst, 664 N.E. 2d 786, 790 (Mass. 1996) 
and others for the similar proposition that an easement may not be expanded to the 
benefit of property not part of the dominant estate. In the present case, allowing Tract B 
tenants to use the Easement to access roadways within Tract B that ultimately lead to a 
parking structure on Tract C benefits Tract B, not Tract C. Thus, these cases do not 
advance the High School's argument. McCann is further distinguishable because the 
court had specifically found that there was a substantial increase in the burden to the 
servient estate and that the burden benefited non-dominant estate property. Neither is the 
case here. 
disobeyed. There is no record that this has ever occurred. Moreover, this issue is 
not on appeal, is not before this Court and does not present an appealable issue, but 
rather is appropriately a matter to address with the district court should the district 
court's order ever be disregarded. 
The absence of a bright line rule is further indicated in the High School's 
own brief. After prominently relying on the analysis set forth in the Restatement 
(Third) of Property, a footnote is later dropped to explain that there are indications 
there may be a shift in the rule. For example, in Ogle v. Trotter, 495 S.W.2d 558 
(Tenn.Ct.App.1973), the court stated that the purpose of the prohibition against 
extending the benefit of an easement to non-appurtenant land is to avoid increased 
burden. Accordingly, the Tennessee court reasoned that where there has been a 
reduction in the use of the easement, an injunction is not proper. Similarly, in 
Carbone v. Vigliotti, 610 A.2d 565 (Conn. 1992), the court found that the addition 
of parcels to the dominant estate, forming a one-building lot, did not changed the 
character or extent of the easement's use. The court distinguished an earlier case, 
which held that an easement can only be used to benefit the dominant estate, 
because, unlike in Carbone, the earlier case involved a material increase in the use 
of the easement. 
Likewise, in Joiner v. Southwest Central Rural Electric Co-op., 786 A.2d 
349 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2001) the court vacated the lower court's ruling that relied on 
the Restatement's prohibition against the use of an appurtenant easement to the 
benefit of a property other than the dominant estate. The Pennsylvania court 
reasoned that the Restatement provisions were "at variance with the 
pronouncements of [Pennsylvania's] Supreme Court." Id. at 351. It stated that the 
court was required to look to the language of the grant, and, if the "purposes of an 
express easement are not specifically stated, the court must ascertain the 
objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of the circumstances." Id. at 
352. 
In Heartz v. City of Concord, 808 A.2d 76 (N.H. 2002), the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court rejected a per se prohibition on property other than the dominant 
estate benefiting from an easement. Rather, the court examined the language of the 
easement and found that nothing in deed's language "indicates an intention to 
prevent non-dominant, third-party tenements from benefiting from the easement." 
Id. at 81. The court then addressed the contention that the use should not be 
allowed because it overburdened the easement. It held that the appellant's 
conclusory statements that the "property will be damaged is insufficient to satisfy 
his burden in opposing [the appellee's] summary judgment motion." Id. at 82. 
VI. UTAH CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT ENJOINING TRACT B 
TENANTS' USE OF THE EASEMENT 
The High School's reliance on Utah cases including Wood v. Ashby, 253 
P.2d 351 (1952) and Alvey v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, 51 P.2d 45 is 
misdirected. These cases suggest that ". . . an easement is extinguished when after 
the division of the dominant estate, a new created parcel does not abut the servient 
tenement." (Appellant's Brief at pp. 14-15.) This is obviously not the 
circumstance in our case. 
In Alvey v. Mackelprang the dominant estate was divided such that Alvey 
received the severed portion of the dominant estate that no longer abutted the 
servient estate. Alvey claimed that although his parcel had been severed from the 
dominant estate, that the prescriptive right-of-way was still appurtenant to his 
parcel. Id. The Court of Appeals found that there are at least four basic 
requirements that must be met for a prescriptive easement to survive a division of 
the dominant tenement, including the requirement that the newly created parcel 
must "abut the way." Alvey v. Mackelprang, 2002 Ut. App. 220, at f^ 13. The 
present case does not involve a prescriptive easement and, more importantly, the 
issue presented by this appeal is whether the Tract B tenants' use of the Easement 
overburdens the Easement, not whether a portion of Tract B has been severed and 
whether the owner of the severed parcel continues to have a right to the Easement. 
Wood v. Ashby involved a somewhat similar circumstance involving the 
division of the dominant estate. In that case the severed portion of the dominant 
estate continued to "abut the way," and the court had to ascertain whether the 
intent of the original grantor and grantee of the easement was for a right of way 
passing though a gate, or whether the easement could be drawn so as to allow 
access to the severed portion of the dominant estate as well. 
The issue of whether an easement remains appurtenant to a parcel severed 
from the dominant estate is not before the court in this appeal and neither Wood 
nor Mackelprang is helpful in this regard. Wood, however, is helpful for its 
proposition that the court must determine whether the use being placed on the 
easement results in a substantial increase in the use of the servient estate other than 
that contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant, looking to the 
circumstances attending the transaction, situation of the parties, and the object to 
be attained. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d at 354. 
Such cases as Wade and Weggeland, both cited by the High School, are not 
helpful either. Weggeland, for instance, addresses whether the easement in that 
case was intended to be exclusive, or whether the grantor retained a right to use his 
own property. The court found that the easement was not exclusive unless the 
grant said so under the principle that "[t]he language of the grant is the measure 
and the extent of the right created. " Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 
(Utah 1963). 
In Wade, the grantor deeded a piece of property without mentioning whether 
he intended to also convey an accompanying easement for ingress and egress. The 
court found that the right of way was implicit in the conveyance, although the 
width of the implied easement was limited to the width of the grantee's 
automobile, according to the principle that the u[c]haracter and extent [of the 
easement] is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the 
dominate estate. " Wade v. Dorius, 173 P. 564, 566 (Utah 1933)(citations omitted). 
Obviously the principle in Weggeland is not helpful at all and the principle 
we get from Wade must be considered in view of the language of the 1983 
Declaration that Tract B may use the Easement "to such extent as may be 
customary for use of Tract Bfor commercial purposes. " (1983 Declaration, 
114(a).) 
The Easement here has never been used for anything other than its intended 
purpose and has never been overburdened. Commercial development of Tract B 
was explicitly contemplated in the 1983 Declaration, and nothing in the 1983 
Declaration otherwise restricts the commercial development. In fact, the 1983 
Declaration clearly anticipates additional future development in the event Tract A 
was not developed. Most importantly, the development of Tract B proceeded just 
as planned as the record evidence of the minutes of the Salt Lake Planning 
Commission show, except that smaller office towers totaling only eighteen (18) 
stories, rather than twenty-five (25) stories, were actually built. 
Whether parking for the office towers takes place in a single parking 
structure, or in two structures, makes no difference; the number of cars associated 
with the originally contemplated twenty-five (25) stories of office space is the 
same. In fact, the number of cars originally intended would logically have been 
greater than the current use by the Tract B tenants. 
VII. EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE EASEMENT IS NOT THE PROPER 
REMEDY FOR MISUSE OF AN EASEMENT, PARTICULARLY 
WHEN THE HIGH SCHOOL HAS FAILED TO PROVE ANY 
INJURY 
Although we believe we have made a persuasive argument why the district 
court should be affirmed, the High School's demand for relief deserves some 
mention. 
The High School demands that the Easement be extinguished. This is not 
the appropriate remedy, even if the court determines that the dominant estate has 
misused the easement. McCann v. R. W. Dunteman Co,, 609 N.E. 2d 1076, at 1084 
(111. App. Ct. 1993) (finding that the forfeiture of the subject easement would be 
"thoroughly inappropriate" in part because the lower court had ordered that non-
dominate estate traffic thereon be eliminated); see, Jon W. Bruce and James W. 
Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, § 1026 (although the 
concept that an easement may be extinguished by misuse has been recognized by 
many courts and commentators, it has rarely been employed to terminate a 
servitude). In Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1986), the Washington 
Supreme Court refused to extinguish an easement where the servient estate failed 
to prove actual injury, and, in Penn Bowling, 1179 F. 2d at 66, the court ruled that 
misuse of an easement right is not sufficient to constitute a forfeiture. 
In this case, the High School has not demonstrated any injury at all, although 
it has had six years to build a case. Obviously, if the High School's students had 
been placed at increased risk the High School would have undertaken preventative 
measures and asked for a preliminary injunction long ago. In fact, the purpose of 
this lawsuit appears to have been aimed at increasing the High School's 
endowment, rather than addressing some purported injury. The Woodlands 
Business Park Association has been maintaining and plowing the right of way for 
years, although the record evidence is that many of those who use the right of way 
are high school students and local residents, not Tract B tenants. The record does 
not suggest that the Easement is overburdened with vehicles or that the High 
School has suffered any injury. A forfeiture of the easement is simply not 
warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Tract B Property Owners respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the district court's order. 
DATED this llTday of April, 2003. 
VUC(JUI 
P. Bruce Badger 
Diane H. Banks 
Matthew L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys Appellees/Defendants Woodlands III 
Holdings, LLC, Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, 
JDJ Properties, Inc., and The Woodlands Business 
Park Association 
MAILING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed via United States Mail, first-class 
postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of APPELLEE'S BRIEF to the 
following counsel of record: 
Robert M. Taylor 
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
fr.nta*'* 
ADDENDUM 
Tab A Diagram used in district court for illustrative purposes 
Tab B Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Tab C 1983 Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions 
Tab D Minutes of November 22, 1983 Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
Meeting 
Tab E Affidavit of John A. Dahlstrom, Jr. 
Tab F Affidavit of Dennis Peacock 
Tab G 6th Amendment to CCRs, Excerpt 
Tab H Profit v. Plymesser, 2001 WL 708884 (Ohio App. 12 Dist.) 
Tab A 
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FIOED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP - 9 2002 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Diane H. Banks (A4966) 
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801) 531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC; 
JDJ Pioperties, Inc.; and The Woodlands Business Park Association 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ) 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT ] 
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, ) 




WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; 
WOODLANDS IV HOLDINGS, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company; BEDFORD 
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a ; 
Maryland corporation; JDJ PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation; THE 
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK ; 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation; WASATCH PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000, 
Defendants. 
1 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
> FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 960908063 PR 
) Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
lAQQin 1 
Defendants, Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, JDJ Properties, Inc., and The Woodlands 
Business Park Association, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment") on or about September 25, 2001. Plaintiff thereafter filed its 
Supplemental Complaint on or about February 8, 2002, joining Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, as 
a defendant. On or about March 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC, joined in the motion papers in support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
motions were fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the court for decision, accompanied by 
a request for oral argument. Both motions came on for hearing before the Honorable Sandra N. 
Peuler on April 22, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. The moving Defendants were represented by P. Bruce 
Badger and Matthew L. Anderson of Fabian & Clendenin. Plaintiff was represented by Stephen 
F. Hutchinson of Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson. Defendant Bedford Property Investors, 
Inc., was represented by Ronald G. Russell of Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
The court heard argument of counsel and having fully considered the parties' respective 
moving papers, including affidavits supporting and opposing the motions, and being otherwise 
fully advised, now enters its order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons set forth in 
the Minute Entry dated April 26, 2002 (attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference) and as set forth in Defendants' memoranda filed in support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
24QR70 1 LL-i. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied for the reasons set forth in the 
Minute Entry (Exhibit "A" hereto) and as set forth in Defendants' memorandum opposing 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. This action involves a non-exclusive easement (the "Easement") appurtenant to 
and across a parcel of property located in Salt Lake County which is currently owned by the Salt 
Lake Lutheran High School. The Easement runs west from 900 East at approximately 4000 
South and was granted for the purpose of providing vehicular access to a portion of what is now 
the Woodlands Business Park located on 700 East. The Easement was created by a Declaration 
of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1983 Declaration"), which was recorded in the 
records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on October 27, 1983, as Entry 3862259, Book 5502, 
Page 1559. The legal descriptions that were attached as exhibits to the 1983 Declaration were 
reversed, so an Amendment to Declaration of Easements, Covenants and Restrictions (the " 1984 
Declaration") was recorded on June 20, 1984, as Entry 3957731, Book 5566, Page 2146, to 
correctly set forth the legal descriptions of the affected parcels. The Easement is referred to in 
the 1983 Declaration as the "Associates Roadway". The servient estate with respect to the 
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract A in the 1983 Declaration, and is 
more particularly described in Exhibit "B" hereto. The dominant estate with respect to the 
Easement or the Associates Roadway is referred to as Tract B in the 1983 Declaration, and is 
more particularly described in Exhibit "C" hereto. 
4. Since the grant of the Easement, the Woodlands Business Park has expanded to 
property north of the dominant estate that the parties to this action have referred to variously as 
( L a 
-JAQQ-m 1 
Tract C, or the "Northern Parcel" or "Expansion Property", which is more particularly described 
in Exhibit "D" hereto. Tract C contains both a high-rise office building ("Tower IV") owned by 
Woodlands IV Holdings LLC, and a multi-level parking facility. 
5. The Easement, which is for the benefit of the dominant estate, has not been 
overburdened by the use of the Easement by the owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires 
of Tract B and their customers, invitees and guests, including their use of the Easement to access 
parking on Tract C. 
6. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract B and their 
customers, invitees and guests, may continue to use the Easement to access parking on Tract C. 
7. The owners, tenants, subtenants and concessionaires of Tract C and their 
customers, invitees and guests, may not use the Easement. Accordingly, Woodlands IV 
Holdings, LLC, shall take all steps necessary to restrict use of the Easement by the Tower IV 
tenants, subtenants and concessionaires and their customers, invitees and guests, including 
notifying them, restricting access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may be 
appropriate. 
8. This Order is an adjudication of all of the claims in this action notwithstanding 
that Wasatch Properties Management, Inc., was joined as a defendant and has never appeared. 
Accordingly, the court expressly determines that there is no just reason to delay entry of final 
judgment and expressly directs entry of this Order as Final Judgment. 
9. Any person may record a certified copy of this Order in the official records 
of the Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The recording of this Order shall serve 
to immediately release the Lis Pendens recorded in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on November 21,1996, as Entry 6511599, Book 7540, Page 10, which referenced 
the real property described in Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" hereto. 
DATED this *\ day of ^ l ^ ^ r v O U c ^ ^ , 2002. 
Approved as to form: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Stephen F. Hutchinson 
Sue J. Chon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the [**' day of August, 2002,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment by hand delivering said 
document as follows: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Sue J. Chon 
Taylor, Adams, Lowe & Hutchinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Ronald G. Russell 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
Attorneys for Bedford Property Investors, Inc. 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT 
"A" 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER 
SALT LAKE AREA, a Utah non-
profit corporation, dba SALT 
LAKE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS LLC, a 
Utah limited liability 
company, et. al. 
Defendants. j 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 960908063 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were held on April 22, 2002. 
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the 'Court took the matter 
under advisement. Now, having fully considered the arguments of 
counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal 
authority the Court enters the following ruling. 
The relevant facts are as follows. In October 1983 Woodland 
Investment Company ("Woodland") owned the parcel of land located at 
4020 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah ("Tract A") and Woodland 
Associates ("Associates") owned the land located directly west of 
Tract A ("Tract B") . On October 27th, 1983 Woodland and Associates 
entered into a "Declaration of Easements Covenants and 
Restrictions" (the "1983 Declaration") under which the parties 
provided for: (1) an easement over Tract A which provided access to 
Tract B from 900 East; and (2) an easement over Tract B which 
t I -I 
LUTHERAN HIGH V PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
WOODLANDS ET. AL. 
provided access to Tract A from 700 East. The language of 
the Declaration evidences the clear intent of the partise 
that both tracks would be commercial in nature. Eventually, Tract 
B developed commercially and currently contains: a parking 
facility, three high rise office buildings (f,Towers I, II and 
III"), open parking areas and two retail centers. Tract A, on the 
other hand, was sold in 19S2 to the Lutheran High School 
Association ("Plaintiff"). 
The current dispute revolves around a contiguous parcel of 
land owned by Woodlands IV and located immediately north of Tract 
B ("Tract C") . Tract C is an expansion of the original development 
and contains both a high rise office building ("Tower IV") and a 
multi level parking facility. Currently, Tract B tenants, working 
at Tower III, are permitted to use Tract C's parking facility. In 
order to reach the parking facility, Tract B workers use the 
easement over Tract A. Plaintiff objects to this use of the 
easement by claiming that it overburdens the easement in conflict 
with the original intention of the parties. 
As an initial matter, both parties agree that the benefit 
of the easement may not be enlarged to include Track C. 
Therefore, the tenants of Tower IV, located on Tract C, may not 
use the easement to access that property, Accordingly, defendants 
are ordered to take all necessary steps to restrict use of the 
LUTHERAN HIGH V PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
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easement by Tower IV tenants, including notifying them, restricting 
access as part of the lease agreements, and such other steps as may 
be appropriate. 
As to the remaining issue, the Court concludes that the 
easement is not overburdened by the Tract B tenants' use of the 
easement to access parking on Tract C. 
Generally, the holder of an easement is entitled to use that 
easement in a banner "reasonably necessary for the convenient 
enjoyment of the servitude." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) 
§4.10 (2000). Additionally, the terms 1983 Declaration indicate 
that this easement was specifically designed for the "benefit" of 
the parties and their tenants. (Declaration of Easements Covenants 
and Restrictions Sec. 4 H d). Here, the tenants of Tract B, for 
whom the easement was originally intended, make no greater use of 
the easement by parking on Tract C, than they would if they parked 
on Tract B; there is no evidence that the parking arrangement 
causes any additional vehicle traffic. In addition, although 
plaintiffs argued that the parking arrangement makes Tract C a 
beneficiary of the easement, there is no evidence in the record to 
support that. Rather, it appears that the tenants of Tract B only 
use the easement for the benefit and enjoyment of the servitude to 
which they are entitled. 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
LUTHERAN HIGH V PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
WOODLANDS ET. AL. 
granted, and plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Minute Entry and submit the same to the Court for review 
and signature. 
Dated this day of April, 2002 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 960908063 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MATTHEW L. ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
215 South State St. Suite 
1200 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151 
Mail STEPHEN F HUTCHINSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
2180 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
SUITE 520 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841060000 
Mail RONALD G RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 SOUTH STATE STE 1300 
PO BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841470019 






The following real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
TRACT I Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-047 
Commencing 145.67 feet South from the Northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 5, Ten Acre 
Plat A, Big Field Survey; thence South 237.13 feet; West 379.5 feet; North 0°06'10" East 
383 feet; East 229.5 feet; South 145.67 feet; East 150 feet to BEGINNING. 2.82 acres. 
TRACT n Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-026 
Commencing North 0°04' East 168.2 feet from the Southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 5, 
Ten Acre Plat A, Big Field Survey; thence North 0°04' East 23.2 feet; West 23 rods 
South 0°04' West 23.2 feet; East 23 rods to BEGINNING 0.2 acres. 
TRACT III Sidwell No.: 16-32-376-044 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 11, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey; thence West 766.09 feet; North 327.21 feet; East 766.09 feet; South 327.21 feet 
to BEGINNING. 
The foregoing notwithstanding Tracts I and II shall be benefited by the Woodland 












BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 5, Ten Acre Plot 
"A", Big Field Survey; and running thence south 0°09'59" West 572.84 
feet to the Southeast corner of said Lot 8, thence South 0°09'59" West 
19.83 feet to the South line of Lot 14A, CLEARVIEW ACRES 
SUBDIVISION; thence South 89°55' West 106.51 feet to the Southeast 
comer of Lot 15A; thence North 88°50'40" West 100.01 feet to the 
Southeast corner of Lot 16A; thence North 89°52'30" West 100.00 feet to 
the Southeast corner of Lot 17A; thence North 89°59'27" West 100.00 feet 
to the Southeast corner of Lot 18 A; thence North 88°23'10" West 100.03 
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 19A; thence North 89°01' West 100.01 
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 20A; thence North 87°39'20" West 
160.11 feet to the Southwest corner of said Lot 20A, CLEARVIEW 
ACRES SUBDIVISION; thence North 0°14' 13" East 6.78 feet to the 
Southwest corner of said Lot 8; Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A"; thence North 
0°14' 13" East 573.07 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 8; thence 
South 89°58'24" East 89.30 feet; thence along the arc of a 622.03 foot 
radius curve to the right 715.24 feet to the point of BEGINNING, said arc 




Real Property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as follows: 
SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-011 
Commencing 352.1 feet South from the Northwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre 
Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence East 150 feet; thence South 65 feet; 
thence West 150 feet; thence North 65 feet to the point of beginning. 
SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-012 
Commencing 50 feet North from the Southwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat 
"A", Big Field Survey, and running thence East 150 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence 
West 150 feet; thence South 50 feet to the point of beginning. 
SidwellNo.: 16-32-352-013 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 9, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey, and running thence West along a 622.03 foot radius curve 715.24 feet, (said arc 
being subtended by a chord of South 89 degrees 59' East 676.48 feet) thence West 82.52 
feet; thence North 50 feet; thence East 150 feet; thence North 50 feet; thence West 150 
feet; thence North 56.52 feet; thence East 150 feet; thence North 130.58 feet; thence East 
389 feet; thence South 13 feet; thence South 85 degrees 34' East 220.6 feet; thence South 
257.1 feet to the point of beginning. 
THE AFORESAID PARCELS ARE FURTHER DESCRIBED BY ALTA/ACSM 
SURVEY AS FOLLOWS: 
WES r PARCEL - NORTH AREA WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK 
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of Lot 9, Block 5, 10 Acre Plat "A", Big Field 
Survey and running thence North 0 degrees 14'13" East along the East line of 700 East 
Street 220.97 feet; thence South 89 degrees 57'56" East 150.00; feet; thence North 0 
degrees 13*23" East 65.00 feet; thence South 89 degrees 5738" East 110.00 feet; thence 
South 0 degrees 02'22" West 208.635 feet to a point on a curve to the left; the radius 
point of which bears South 15 degrees 30'15" East 622.03 feet; thence Southwesterly 
along the arc of said curve 189.008 feet; thence North 89 degrees 58'24" West 89.30 feet 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
Exhibit D (con't) 
EAST PARCEL - NORTH AREA WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK 
BEGINNING at a point North 0 degrees 14' 13" East along the East line of 700 East 
Street 220.97 feet and South 89 degrees 51'36" East 150.00 feet and North 0 degrees 
13*23" East 65.00 feet, and South 89 degrees 57'38" East 110.00 feet from the Southwest 
corner of Lot 9, Block 5,10 Acre Plat "A" Big Field Survey and running thence South 89 
degrees 57'38" East 285.26 feet; thence South 0 degrees 11 '14" West 17.30 feet; thence 
South 85 degrees 34'00" East 220.80 feet; thence South 0 degrees 09'59" West 251.59 
feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 9, Block 5,10 Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey, said 
point also being on a curve to the left, the radius point of which bears South 32 degrees 
58'02" West 622.03 feet; thence Westerly along the arc of said curve 526.228 feet; 
thence North 0 degrees 02'22" East 208.635 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
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G) DECLARATION OF EASEKENTS, 
0^ COVENANTS AND RESTRICTIONS 
THIS DECLARATION (the "Declaration11) is. made and*". 
entered into thio a 1 day of OcniVag/a, ; 1983} b y arid 
between WOODLAND INVESTMENT Co., a Utah limited partnership. 
1"Woodland"), and THE WOODLANDS ASSOCIATES, a joint venture 
organized purouanfc *"* ••he Utah Uniform Partnerohip Act 
("Associates"), 
RECITALS 
A, Woodland ovno a tract of real property ("Tract.A") 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the legal dcocription 
of wh5ch io oec forth on Exhibit "A." 
B, .Asoociatea, contemporaneously with.the execution 
of thio Declaration, io acquiring a tract of real, property;« ,'« 
("Tract D") located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, tho .legal 
description of which io oet forth on Exhibit "B." 
C, The portico" dcoiro to
 t create certain croao 
eaoencnto and righto between and inpooo cortain covenanto end 
rcotriction on Tracto A and B. 
7"~RE?0RE, "for TEN DOLLARS'($10.00)'and otnor ftood'anu"" 
valuable cokoideration, tho receipt and oufficioncy of which ara 
hereby acknowledged, the partioo agreoao follovoi' 
!• Definitions. An used in thia Declaration! 
(a) "Party" mcano each pcroon executing thi8 
inotrument and ito hciro, aooigno and oucr.caaorc in interact with 
respect to Tract A or Tract D, ao the ca<ic may be, ao the some 
may be ohovm by the records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
as of the date of the cxerciae of powers granted hereunder or the 
performance of or failure of performance by such Partiea of the 
obligations created by thia Declaration. Without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, the term Party rcfera to the pcraona 
vho fit the following claoaificacionoi 
(i) .The peraon or persona holding fee title 
to all or any portion of Tract A or Trace Bj and 
(ii) The Iccoce or leeeeeo under a ground 
lease of all or a portion of any Tract for a fixed minimum term 
of thirty (30) yearn, or longer, in which event the^fee owner of 
the real property covered by euch leoee will not be"deemed to be 
a Party aa to ouch Tract or portion of such Tract" for the 
urpoaes of thic Declaration during the duration of such ground 
eaoe. 
(b) •'Partiea" ceano every person whoio a Party, 
taken in the aggregate. 
2. Coven an tS'" and Restrictions with Re8pect to Tract 
JB. 
(a) No party ohall attempt to obtain or consent 
to any change or variance in toning of Tract B if ouch change 
would jeopardize the right of Woodland, ito succeaooro and.* 
aooigno, to retain and maintain- any oign described in Section 3 
of this Declaration. 
(b> The official nacc^of any building' complex 
located on Tract D will- contain. tho -word "Woodland11 or 
"Woodlando11 unleoo tho": use of oucn word ia not permitted by. 
applicable lawo,.rcgulationu or ordinances The owner of Truce B 
ohall have the righc to relieve Tract B of tho obligation impoaed 
by thio Section 2(b) by pay inn to the owner of Tract A, in a lump 
oum, tho amount of $100,000 for tho oxpreoo and eola purpooa of 
obtaining nuch ralief, 
(c) Ho part of Tract" B'*shall, tor'"a period of 
ti/onty-fivo (25) yoaro toll owing, tha-'deia of'thia Daclarocion, be 
uood ao a-Thoator-IlaGtaurantr.providcd,.; that.thia-restriction 
I 
ohall be void i f no Theater-Restaurant io operated on Tract A for 
a continuous period of sixty (60) monthB. For purposea of this 
Section 2(c) , the tern "Theater-Restaurant" ahail mean a public 
or private dining f a c i l i t y , operated for profit, having 20 or 
more tables, where l ive vocal, theatrical or comedy entertainment 
iB regularly provided. 
(d) If construction of a Health Club on Tract A 
i s coamenced before the latter of one (1) year from the date of 
thio Drclaration or nine (9) tnontho after the commencement of 
conctruction of the f ^ r t building on Tract B, then for ao long 
as such Health Club ie completed within a reasonable time and 
continuously available to tne Parties with respect to Tract B and 
a l l tenatita of auch Parties and a l l of the personnel of such 
tenants, at pricca competitive with or less than those beinc 
charged by Health Clubs open to the general public, no Health 
Club wi l l be operated on Tract B or directly or indirectly by 
Asaociateo (but no*, i to successors) within a radiuo of 5/8's of a 
n i l e of Tract A. For purposes of this Section 2(d), the term 
•'Health Club" chall wean a public or private faci l i ty containing 
a jogging fac i l i t y , exercise and weight room, a sauna, swimming 
pool, tennis or racquetball court, a Jacuzzi or similar 
s ignif icant exercioc f a c i l i t y . 
3. Signs on Tract B. Subject to the limitations set 
forth below, AooociAces granca to Woodland the right to erect and 
operate on Tract B, at any time and from time to timo, one 
free-otanding doublc-cided sign (the "Woodland Sign"), which may 
be a "pylon" oign. The deoign and operation of the Woodland Sign 
chall comply with the following conditions* 
(n) Any Woodland Sign may be electrically-lighted 
and may display l ighted, electronically activated messages. The 
dimenoiono, height and otyle of any woodland Sign shall bo . 
designated by woodland but chall be oubject to the approval of a 
licenced building architect. Such architect shall bo chosen by 
the Party owning Tract B from a l io t of three licenoed,building 
architects oelected by Woodland, Tho face or faces of any 
Woodland Sign shall be located within a square or rectangle, and 
said oquaro or rectangle shall not exceed 275 squaro fact per 
Gide. o, 
(b) Any Woodland Sign ohall ba eroctod on a on 
pored of land located in tho Scuthwcot corner of Tract B and £^1 
described on Exhibit "C" (tho "Woodland Sign Location"). To the ^ 
extent fcaoible the Woodland Sign ohall ba located on the 
couthern ten (10) feet of the Woodland Sign Location. The 
Woodland Sign cay be altered or replaced from time to time as 
long aa the alteration or replacement complies with the 
limitationn oet forth in this Section 3. 
(c) The Woodland Sign nay not be used to 
advertioe or refer in any way to an office or officca for rent. 
.4 
(d) The dcaign and operation of any Woodland Sign 
will comply with all applicable lawo, ordinances and regulations, 
(e) Woodland, at its cost and expenoe, shall 
maintain any Woodland Sign in good and cafe operating condition. 
If Woodland fails to maintain any Woodland Sign, then, on one 
hundred eighty (100) dayo' written notice to .Woodland, Associates 
nay either cauoe cuch maintenance to be performed or have tha 
sign removed and ahall have a lien on Tract A for the amount 
expended in maintaining (but not removing) any Woodland Sign; 
plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12X) per annua from 
the date of such expenditure. 
(f) Notwithstanding any other provioion contained 
in thio Section 3, the right of Woodland and its aucccssoro and* 
assigns to erect any Woodland Sign and to.posoesa the Woodland 
Sign Location chall be extinguiohed if ouch oign is not erected 
within five (5) years of the date hereof or it such oign, onco 
erected, ia abandoned for a continuous period of ona (1) year 
thereafter. 
(g) Woodland ond each pcroo'n constituting a Part? 
with respect to Tract A ohall -indemnify, defend and nold. 
Asoociacco an<* csch pcroon constituting a Party with respect tc 
Tract B harmless fron and against any and all liabilities*' 
losses, actiono, proceedings, judgmento, controversiest claimsj 
coots or expeneca (including cttomevo1 fceo) arising out of the 
design, use or operation of any Woodland Sign. 
(h) Ho right granted to Woodland by this Section 
3 chall limit or rcctrict in cny way the right of Associates to 
erect and operate (or permit to be erected aud operated) oigno on S 
Tract B. ' & 
(i) Aoaociaceo may place on Tract A a sign Advertising 
the office project to be located on Tract B. Such sign may 
remain until April 30, 1984. 
4. Grant of Easement. 
(a) Woodland granto to Associates a nonexclusive 
easement appurrenant to and acroao Trace A for the purpose of 
allowing vehicular acceos between the public streets ana any and 
all parfcing arcno or roadwayo and laneo aituated on Tract Bj 
provided, that the foregoing right of acceoo oholl be liciitcd to 
use for such purpoaes and to auch extent ao may be cuatonary for 
uce of Tract B for commercial purpoaeo (including! but not 
limited to, reasonable and customary deliveries)* -.The eASement 
granted by thia subsection (a) ahall be United to the zondvay ' 
described on Exhibit MD" <tho "Asoociateo Roadway11) < At any time 
before December 31, 1903, by giving written notice to Aoeociates. 
Woodland may relocate the Aooociatco Roadway up to twenty-five 
(25) feet to the north or oouth of the cente'rlinc of the 
Asoociateo Roadway ae deocribed on Exhibit "D." Thereafter, 
Woodlend ehnll not move or relocate the Aoaociatee Roadway, In 
addition to the foregoing, Aaaocioteo ahall have the right to 
elevate or Gink the western twenty (20) feet of tho Associates 
Roadway in order to align the oame with the upper and/or lower 
decka of a parking ramp. On or before Novcmner ~30 j 1984 
Woodland agrceo to conotruct a paved roadway twenty-five (25)-
feet wide on the Aaoociateo Roadway in accordanco. with good 
construction practices* 
<b) Associates granto to Woodland a honoKcluolve 
casement oppurtenant to end acrooo Tract B for tha purpooc of 
allowing vehicular acccao between the public otrecto ana any and 
all parking creao oituoted on Tract Ai 'The casement granted by 
thio ouboection (b) ahall be limited to tho roadway deocribed on 
Exhibit "E" (tho "Woodland Roadway11),-. In addition AsoociatOQ 
ahall provide a twenty-five (25) toot two-way access lane;from 
the Woodland Roadway to the Aooociate3 Roadway in ouch ..location 
as Asoociateo nay designate (tho "Connecting Roadway").'- At any 
time before December 31, 1983».by giving written notico-.to-. 
Woodland, Aaoociateo nay relocato tho Woodland Roadway u£ to e* 
twenty-fivo (25) feet to tho north or oouch of the centerlina of § 
the Woodland Roadway ao described on Exhibit uEi". Thereafter Cn 
Asoociateo ahall not move or relocato the Woodland'Roadway» . On ^ 
or before June 30, 1985 Aocociateo agrceo to contruct a paved {o 
roadway tvency-five (25) feet wido on the Woodland. Roadway and 
che Connecting Roadway in accordance with good construction 
practices. The foregoing notwithstanding the easements granted 
over the Woodland Roadway and che Connecting Roadway ahall be 
subject to the following conditional 
( i) The easement for the Connecting Roadway 
i s l imited to oeven (7) feet in hcightj 
( i i ) The easements far the Woodland Roadway 
and the Connecting Roadway arc United to use for cuch purpoaea 
and to auch extent ec may be customary for uac of Tract A for 
commercial purpoaea (including, but not United to, reasonable 
and customary 'deliveries consistent vith the foregoing height 
restr ict ion) and to erect and maintain any Woodland Signi 
( i i i ) A parking ramo or any similar 
otructure cay be constructed on Tract B except over the Woodland 
Roadway, and Aooociatea may route al l traffic using the 
Connecting Roadway through euch structure on the upper and/or the 
lower deck of any ouch ocructurcj and 
(iv) The location of the Connecting Roadway 
may be altered, relocated or changed in any Banner and at any 
cirar and from time to timo without the prior written conoent of 
Woodland upon oixty (60) dayo1 prior written'notice.to Woodland. 
(c) The Parties agree to keep and maintain at ito 
sole cost and expenca tha roadways located on ito Tract in good 
condition. If a Party fa i l s to oo keep and maintain tho roadway 
for which i t is Responsible, or to construct tho same, the other 
Party may on thirty (30) dayo written notico to perform ouch, 
maintenance and/or construction and the performing party shall 
have G l i en on tho Tract owned by tho defaulting Party.for tha: 
amount expended pluo intcreot at the rato of twelve percent (12l) 
per annum from tnc date of ouch expenditure. 
(d) Tho caoomenta granted pursuant to this 
Section 4 ohall benefit each of tha Portico and thair reopectivo 
tononto, concessionaires, cuotoccroi inviteeo and gucafco, and tha 
concessionaire, inviteeo, cuotomoro and gucoto of an?-tenant or 
subtenant of th« reopectivo Portico, g 
5. Durotlon. Thio Declaration and csch easement, ~* 
covenant, restriction and undertaking of this Declaration shall a 
be for a term of ninccy-nina (99) ycaro unless sooner terminated 
pursuant to Section 2, 
6. Hodificntlon, Thio Declcration and any eaoement, 
covenant, rcotr icc ion or undertaking contained here in may be 
.terminated, extended, codi f ied or amended as to the whole of the 
Tracts of any portion of then, v i t h the unanimous*, concent, of the 
Tart iea . 
7
« Hot a PuSlic Dedicat ion, Nothing '.contained in 
th io Declaration w i l l be deemed to bo a g i f t or a^dedicotion of 
any portion of e i ther Tract to the general public or for the 
general public or for ony public purpose whatoocver, i t being the 
in t en t of the Partiea that thio Declaration be s t r i c t l y l imited 
to and for the purpose expressed here in , 
fi. Mutuality^ Denetito one Burdens Run v i t h Landi 
(a) Each and a l l or the easements* covenants, 
r e o t r i c t i o n o , right3 and provis ions granted or created horein are 
appurtcnancca to the Tracta and none of the eaoemonto,'covenants, 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , righto and provioiono may be transferred, assigned,* 
or encumbered except ao an appurtenance to fluch Tracto. For the 
purposeo of the easementa, covenants , r e s t r i c t i o n s , r ights and 
provis ions created by th i s Declarat ion, the Tract benefited w i l l 
c o n s t i t u t e tho dominant e s t a t e , and the Tract burdehod by such 
teseaicnta, covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r ights and provis ions v i l l 
c o n s t i t u t e tho s e r v i e n t . e s t s t o . 
(b) Each-and a l l of the cascccnto, covenants, , 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , condit ions , r ights and provisions contained in th is 
Declaration (whether affirmotivo or negative in nature) are madoj, 
for the direct:, nutuel and rec iproca l benefit of each Tractj v i l l -
create mutusl. couitablc oervitudca upon each Tract running v i t h 
the landi v i l l t ind and inure to tho benefit of every person, 
having any f e e , ' l e a s e h o l d , ' o r other intoreot in any portion-.of 
the Tracts at any t i n e or from t ino to time to tho oxtont that 
ouch portion io affected or bound by the caocnont,., covenant,*; 
r e s t r i c t i o n , r ight or .prov is ion in qucotion, .or that tho..casa- -
ncnt , covenant, r e s t r i c t i o n , r iant or provision • i o ; to be g 
performed on ouch portioni and w i l l bind and inuro to tho benefit £h 
of the Portico.and the ir reopectivo heiro,*ouccooooro and aosirmfi en 
no to their rcoDcctiva Tracts: C 
9. Miscellaneous Provisions. 
(a) . The Parties do not by this Declaration, in 
any way or for any purpose, become partners or joint venturers of 
each other in the conduct of their resoective businessea or 
otherwise. 
(b) Each Party ohall be excused for the period of 
any delay in the* performance of any obligations .hereunder when 
prevented from timely performing*by a cause or-cauoeo beyond auch 
Party!s control, including labor disputco, c iv i l .Commotion, war, 
governmental rogulationo, moratorium or controlai fire or other 
casualty, inability to obtain.any material or oervices*, or acta 
of Cod. • 
(c) Failure of a Party to inolotjupon the atrict 
performance of any proviaion or to exercise any option hereunder 
shall not.be construed aa a waiver for-future purposes with 
rccpect to an7 «uch proviaion or option. ' Ho proviaion of this 
Declaration ahc.ll be deemed to have .been'waived unleoo such 
waiver io in writing and.oignc.d by. tho'Party alleged to havo 
waived ita righta. 
m • .--(d) If,. any provision of thio Declaration or tho 
application thereof to/ any poroon/or circunotanco ohall* to'any 
extent be invalid, .tho remainder .of
 m thio Declaration of the 
application of ouch'provision to fccroono or-circurietancco other 
than those ao to which, i t io held invalid'shall, not be. affected 
thereby and cnch provision of this Declaration ohail be'valid; and 
enforced to the fu l l e s t extent permitted by law, 
(e) Exccph ao" othcrwiao" provided j \"all* provisions 
herein ohall be binding upon-end ohall inur a- to. the. benefit ..of . 
the Partieo*, their legal reprcocntativea*-; heirs i^Bucceoooro and' 
assigns* 
(f) Each person- executing' thio•Daclaration"fbr.;an 
entity rcpreaents and warranto \ that* he io . duly -..'authorized* to 
executo and deliver the camcon behalf .of. tho .entity .for. which'he 
io oignlng (whether i t . b o - a corporation!, general 'or-linitod%Jf]' 
partnership or otherwise), and that thio Declaration- is ' binding 
upon ouch entity in accordance with;, i t a .terns, 
(g) This Declaration shall ba cons trued • in 
accordance vith the laws of tho State of Utah. 
(h) All exhibito referred to in thio Declaration, 
are hereby incorporated by reference, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tho pfirtieo hereto have executed 
this Declaration ori the: day and year first OCL forth above; 
"WOODLAND"i 
VOODtAHD INVESTMENT CO,, a Utah 
limited partnership 
''ASSOCIATES" 
tHE 'WOODLAfiDS'-ASSOClATESV a joint venture organised under 
the Utah .Uniform Partnership < 
Act by ita.twoi Venturerst/«*:.; 
tMP VoODU*&S ,'• LTD",- i";i ti talv: 
limitod partnershipi by;its 
oolo general partner* KHC . .; 
PROPERTIES! INCi^axUtah'-*? 
corporation* • *. ;^KrV;>- "3 
M 
\/*Zr\ n 
( M U A 
SLC-1 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a 
Wiaconoin U n i t e d partnershipi 
by i ta oole general partner 
JOHNSON V7AX DEVELOPHENT 
CORPORATION, a Wisconsin 
corporation 
Its" 
STATE OF ML 
COUNTY OF ±2l *££ -aA- ocr.« 
On t)\z&2-6*y/Q£ jCfr ., 
appeared before tnc s'+rfs+f/ /K // 
duly oworn, did eay cEac ne io /7s^/JA / MA 
Utah l imi tec 
1963 j petoonaily 
vho being by tao 
of HOODLANl 
oaid WA} INVESTMENT CO.+ a -« — .
 r - - r , 
,^rf^^l.U^M^y duly, acknowledged to mo that the 
execucad within and £01 
oa<L£
 >p^r-iftierah,$<p» 
• My tocainaibn Sapircot 
pnrcrterahipi and 
] # . lo le ge  to no 
ofegoing'iriotrument wao aisled en behalf o£ 
sliding* at^^/ZJ' /fy'//£/L 
STATE"or* ^/%S: 
COUNT? WK^///*A±- ) 
On t h o f f ^ a f r bf \ffltfc/6/A y \ "?iU983n fcofcoonallyiv 
apoeatcd hofora no &/j/77tfW.l/!st . ^ ~ ' ? ' , r ivho^bolng by ni'-
duly evomi did oay thac'ho la » *-*i^sJ>/'sff* * «> .^
 l0f» KHCv—: 
PROPERTIES, INCi
 f- a • Utah' corporation which £0 the general.-«*V 
partner of MHP-Woodlandoi ttd% l-a Utah limited pafctnarohipi fchich, 
to ono or tho caobaro>o£ Tho UoodUndo AoaociatoBi o-Jolht»*Vv' 
venture nrQontttOd purauant tp*tho«Utoh Unlfena Partnership Act» 
and oaid ^*STsi// /* y?2h/}//iM A "* , r duly ochnoviodood to DO 
that tho a^ irifcudtfd vixaitx and IQr02,0ln& inatrvmnt ttaa^eighad on 
behalf of raid corporation in ito capacity ao the oole general 
partner of MH? -Woo ell and a, Ltd., on behalf of eaid'partnerEhlp' in1 
ico cflpxreity ao one of the venturers of The Woodlands Associatea, 
on...behalf'of oaid partnership, by authority of. i t s bylauo or a 
*c.Eolutioh\*6?.ito board of directors 
1
 • bly ZowdLpo lbqn Expiree t iX^m-— ^ 'WtW&L 
STATE. OP-' 'J&L 
COUNTY OF ^ ///'/t/s ^ )' \ 
On j h c / / ^ $ n y ot.<&>?/lM jf- 1963V personally* appeared 3
- *- Wrr*t^&/b.K^'*r//J(ri i ~«vno being by CQ-duljr evomj die 
J& " ~" " •" •"" 
Wio 
J* /'. 
before oe . 7// 7/^i./£ ,<^tr/AL» i «vho being by ca'duly evo j did 
aay that ho io JT^AAIJAS^T' '' of JOHNSOM WAX. DEVELOPMENT. 
CORPORATIONj a wioconoin corporation\. which-vie.* the general*-t 
partner of .SLC-1 Limited Partncrchipj -a-,Wioconoin • limited^/v 
partnerohip, which la one of tho Leabora'of Tha Wood lend flV#£ 
Aooociateo, a Joint ventuto • orgnniied^mrouant* to'.^ho^Utah'V 
Uniform Partnerohip Act,, ond* oaid ^JwC^/^f // t^/y//3L,.culy 
acknowledged to me that tho: orcecutod within, and. xorogoir.g 
inatrument wao oigned on behalf of caid. corporation ..iru ito < 
capacity ao tho oolo general;, partner of SLC-lr\Lihiitod.,; 
Partnerohip, on behalf of oaid partnerohip in. i to bopacity.fcl)'one 
of the venturcro of The Woodlands Aooociateo *,:*ou behalf, of-said-
partnerohip, by authority of i to ; bjlawo or a..rooolution**of ito-
^tJ^crd.gf dircr.r.oroi 
•<:;\ /*-My Cocnhioion Expireoi ^ f e ^ 
4*' 







November 22, 1983 
The applicant was not present. There was no one else for or against 
the application present. 
By motion, seconded, the Planning Commission unanimously continued the 
application until December 2 0, 1983. 
fPL-83-3013 - THE WOODLAND ASSOC. - 4405 SOUTH 700 EAST -
OFFICE/COMMERCIAL COMPLEX - ZONE C-2 - (MILLCREEK) 
This project was given conteptual approval previously. They have 
ref iled as a PUD to allow a variance in the height requirements of the 
buildings. They are proposing the north retail building to be two 
stories a bank building on the south corner of the project. The south 
office tower will be 5 stories, the middle one 8 stories, and the tower 
to the north 12 stories in height. There will be a multi-level 
parking structure east of the high rises which will be four levels high 
at the highest point. The staff recommended approval subject to the 
conditions on file. 
John Hampshire, representing the applicant, .stated all the retail 
facility and the center 8 story tower building will be Phase I. The 
bank could be developed at anytime during the first phase. Basically 
they will construct the plateau and plaza level including all the front 
landscaping as part of the first phase. The 5 story tower would be 
Phase II, and the 12 story as the last phase. The completion date for 
the entire project being approximately four years. 
There was no one else present for or against the application. 
By motion, seconded, the Planning Commission unanimously approved the 
staff recommendation, subject to the following conditions: 
1. Staff review of the plans. 
2. Receiving other recommendations 
3. Submitting the drawings required by the PUD ordinance. 
4. Showing the phasing. 
#PL-83-2203 - CHARLOTTE MOLNAR - 237 WEST 3680 SOUTH - ALCHOHOL 
RECOVERY - ZONE M-l - (MILLCREEK) 
This is a request to allow a quasi-public use of an alcho'hol recovery 
unit. The staff recommended approval subject to the conditions on file. 
Louise Clawson, representing the applicant, stated they will have 
maximum capacity of 40 people, who will be supervised 24 hours a day. 
The residents will be transported to work, and will not be allowed to 
drive their own cars. The average length of stay will be 90 days. The 
maximum length of stay would be 6 months. The residents are not a 
court order or criminal clientel. If approval is given, they 
anticipate being there 3 years. There will be three staff members on 
the premises all the time, however, there will be other staff members 
there during the day. The building will not be changed drastically 
making it possible to return it to an industrial use if this facility 
does not stay at this location. 
TabE 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Diane H. Banks (A4966) 
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; JDJ Properties, Inc.; and 
The Woodlands Business Park Association 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ) 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT ) 
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 




WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a ) 
Utah limited liability company, BEDFORD ) 
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a ) 
Maryland corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES, ) 
INC., a Utah corporation, THE ) 
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK ) 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit ) Civil No. 960908063 PR 
corporation, WASATCH PROPERTY ) 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, ) Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000, ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I am Executive Vice President, General Counsel of Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc., which is under contract to manage the Woodlands Business Park, located at 
approximately 4000 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Office Tower 1 at the Woodlands Business Park is eight (8) stories in height and 
is owned by JDJ Properties, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
4. Office Tower 2 at the Woodlands Business Park is six (6) stories in height and is 
owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC, a Utah limited liability company. 
5. Office Tower 3 at the Woodlands Business Park is four (4) stories in height and is 
owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC. 
6- Office Tower 4 at the Woodlands Business Park is not owned by any of the 
Defendants named in this lawsuit. 
7. There are also two retail buildings at the Woodlands Business Park; one is owned 
by JDJ Properties, Inc., the other is owned by Woodlands III Holdings, LLC. 
8. The tenants and customers of the retail space and Office Towers I, II and III park 
in two parking structures. One parking stmcture with 2 levels, situated immediately east of the 
three office towers, is owned by the Woodlands Business Park Association, a Utah non-profit 
coiporation. The second parking structure with 3 levels is situated northeast of Office Tower III, 
abutting the roadway within the Woodlands Business Park. Access to the parking 
228806-1 2 
structure which is situated northeast of Office Tower III is via 700 East, 3900 South or the right-
of-way from 900 East along tlie north boundary of tlie Lutheran High School property. 
9. An accurate photograph of the right-of-way on the Lutheran High School 
Property leading to the parking structure situated, to tlie east of Office Towers 1, II and III is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
10, An accurate photograph of the parking .structure situated to the northeast of Of6.ce 
Tower HI is attached as Exhibit "B". 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this of September, 2001. 
'ahlstrom, Jr. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before m^o^his / f ^ _ d a y of September 2001. 
NOTARY PUMJC 
REBECCA F. HICKS 
8661 South 1700 E«tf 
Sandy, UT 64003 
My Commission ExptaM 
January 10,2004 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the .^p 7 - ' day of September, 2001,1 hereby certify that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. DALHSTROM, JR., ESQ. by depositing 
said document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert M. Taylor 
Sue J. Chon 
TAYLOR, ADAMS, LOWE & HUTCHINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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TabF 
P. Bruce Badger (A4791) 
Diane H. Banks (A4966) 
Matthew L. Anderson (A7459) 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801)531-8900 
Facsimile: (801)531-1716 
Attorneys for Defendants Woodlands III Holdings, LLC; Woodlands IV Holdings, LLC; JDJ 
Properties, Inc.; and The Woodlands Business Park Association 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL ; 
ASSOCIATION OF THE GREATER SALT ; 
LAKE AREA, a Utah non-profit corporation, ] 




WOODLANDS III HOLDINGS, LLC, a ; 
Utah limited liability company, BEDFORD ; 
PROPERTY INVESTORS, INC., a ; 
Maryland corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES, ] 
INC., a Utah corporation, THE ; 
WOODLANDS BUSINESS PARK ; 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-profit ; 
corporation, WASATCH PROPERTY : 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, ; 
and JOHN DOES 1-1,000, ' 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS PEACOCK 
1 Civil No. 960908063 PR 
) Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
245053-1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DENNIS PEACOCK, having been duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I state the following facts upon my own personal knowledge and if called upon to 
testify concerning these facts I would be competent to do so. 
2. I am employed by Wasatch Property Management as the Facilities Manager of the 
Woodlands Business Park, which is located at approximately 4000 South 700 East in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. I am presently at the Woodlands Business Park on a daily basis and have been 
continuously employed at the Woodlands Business Park since approximately 1985. 
3. The construction of Tower IV at the Woodlands Business Park was commenced 
in June 2000 and was completed in July 2001. It is today only partially leased and the most 
direct and best access to Tower IV is from 700 East, not the right of way easement from 900 
East. 
4. I have observed that many of those who use the right of way between 900 East 
and the Woodlands Business Park are Lutheran High School students who get to school by 
driving tlirough the Woodlands Business Park from 700 East, or neighborhood residents who cut 
through the Woodlands Business Park from 900 East to 700 East, or residential condominium 
owners who live in a condominium development immediately north of the Lutheran High 
School. The right of way also provides access to fire trucks and ambulances. 
5. The Woodlands Business Park has four main entrances on 700 East which is the 
primary route of most of the tenants and patrons of the Woodlands Business Park. 
245053-1 2 
6. The right of way from 900 East is regularly maintained year round and is plowed 
throughout the winter by Wasatch Property Management under a maintenance contract with The 
Woodlands Business Park Association. The High School does not maintain the right of way. 
*% Vi 
DATED this day of April 2002. 
U /t/lU) 
— / / 
Dennis Peacock 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of April, 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Annette E. Clark 
81S South Stilt, 12th f* 
8*H Lake City, UUt» 841H 
My CommlMion Expire* 
November 20.2002 




CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
On the 7%- day of April. 2002.1 hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS PEACOCK, by hand delivering said document as 
follows: 
Robert M. Taylor 
SueJ.Chon 
TAYLOR. ADAMS. LOWE & HUTCHINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2180 South 1300 East. Suite 520 
Salt Lake City. UT 84106 
Ronald G. Russell 
Pair, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless 
Attorneys for Bedford Property Investors. Inc. 
185 South State. #1300 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
245053-1 A 
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Woodlindj 111 HoWing* LLC 3 
Bedford Fropcrt) InvctJon lnc IA 
Bedford hiy*"; lavoioa IBC ) 





Ocll Lo) MiA*ca 
1 rott 
Rot*r\ P O I C T 
1 *v»c 
Rotx-n FVurr 
1 » o c 
Rofccn I V u t t 
\ *\Mf 
NfcoodUrds lit Holdup I LC 
)99 Nonh SUtn S*i4c 200 
Lo|w LT W)2I 
IWdto"d Prujxnv lovnion lnc 
270 ljJ*ycu< Circle 
U/»rcu« CA *<M9 
Bedford Ptoc»cm Investor*, lnc 
270 Uiir«tc Cxck 
Ls/r»me, CA **V»9 
Bedford Mv^'ty ia-mscri lnc 
270 lafi*ttt? CmW 
Ufi>mt CA *<M9 
It is acknowledged and i^rrcd h% thr *>twiit»nn »nd it* Members rtut the o*.-nrr of Parrel 
developed with uiipfutcinciH* in the ruiuie 
Section 6 No Parking Right Notwithstanding mything to the contrary 
contained in the Declaration as amended it is hereby acknowledged and agreed that 
admission of the Additional Property to the Association in no v.ay transfers to Bedford or 
any subsequent owner of the Additional Propcrt) any nght whatsocNer any right to park on 
the existing Parking Structure (as it ma> be modified in the future), the Common Parking 
Areas or the ljmitcd Parking Areas of the Woodlands Dusiness Park as existed prior to this 
amendment, unless such parking is approved by trie unanimous vote of the Members of the 
Association Nothing contained in this Section 6 shall affect any right of Bedford, as the 
owner of Parcel 3. and the tenants. tn> iters and employees of the improvements thereon, to 
park within the existing Parking Structure 
Sectwn 7 No Casement It is hereby acknowledged and agreed that 
admission of the Additional Propert) to the Association in no way permits the use of that 
certain 'Associates Road* a)" adjacent to the eastern boundanr of the Association, as defined 
in that Declaration of nascments Covenants and Restrictions recorded October 27. 1983 as 
Entry No 3562239 in Book ^502 at Page 1559 of the official records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder 
Section 8 Arfritniion In the ocnt that any vote of the Association becomes 
deadlocked, such that a majority of the votes arc not cast for or against any item upon which 
the Association is required to vote, my Member of the Association, upon not less than ten (10) 
days' pnor written notice to the other Members of the Association may submit such maner 'o 
arbitration in acrordancc with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association In connection *!th such proceeding the Owners of Parcels 2 4 and 5 shall 
together be entitled to select one arbitrator the Owners of Parcels IA 3 and the Northern 
Tract shall be entitled to select a second arbttntor and those two arbitrators shall together 
select a third arbitrator for the panel The fees and expenses of the first two arbitrators shall 
be paid by the pan) selecting that arbitrator and the fees and expenses of the third arbitrator 
S3 
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CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Brown 
County. 
Michael D. PROFFITT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael PLYMESSER, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. CA2000-04-008. 
June 25, 2001. 
Robert F. Benintendi, Georgetown, OH, for 
plaintiffs-appellees. 
Danny R. Bubp and Richard D. Weghorst, West 
Union, OH, for defendants- appellants. 
OPINION 
VALEN. 
*1 Defendants-appellants, Michael D. and Leslie 
Tricia Plymesser, appeal a Brown County Court of 
Common Pleas decision resolving a dispute about 
the use of a right-of-way. Based upon the analysis 
that follows, the decision of the trial court is 
affirmed. 
Plaintiffs-appellees, Michael D., Jack W., and 
Charlotte Proffitt, own land near Free Soil Road in 
Georgetown, Ohio, adjacent to land owned by 
appellants. Appellants and the Proffitts both farm 
their land. Their properties share a common 
boundary. The Proffitts have a right of ingress and 
egress across appellants' land to access Free Soil 
Road. The parties agree that this right- of-way was 
created by a grant in the deed to the property now 
owned by appellants. This easement is 
acknowledged in the current deeds held by 
appellants and the Proffitts. 
The Proffitts filed a complaint against appellants 
alleging, inter alia, that appellants had illegally 
erected gates across the right-of-way. Appellants 
filed a counterclaim that requested, inter alia, a 
determination of the extent of the Proffitts' right to 
use the right-of-way for ingress and egress. 
The trial judge visited the land owned by 
appellants and the Proffitts to view the right-of-way 
and its surrounding area. After a two-day bench 
trial, the trial court issued a decision resolving the 
right-of-way dispute between the parties. Appellants 
appeal, raising three assignments of error for our 
consideration. 
Assignment of Error No. 1: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING 
APPELLANTS, THE SERVIENT ESTATE 
OWNERS, TO REMOVE THEIR GATES 
FROM THE TERMINI OF THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT. 
An easement is "the grant of a use on the land of 
another." Alban v. R.K. Co. (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 
229, 231. More specifically, an easement is "a right, 
without profit, created by grant or prescription, 
which the owner of one estate, called the dominant 
estate, may exercise in or over the estate of another, 
called the servient estate, for the benefit of the 
former." Trattar v. Rausch (1950), 154 Ohio St. 
286, paragraph one of the syllabus. An easement 
"may be acquired only by grant, express or implied, 
or by prescription." Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
A trial court's interpretation of an easement will be 
reviewed de novo, but any reasonable findings of 
fact will be upheld if the reviewing court determines 
that the trial court's decision is supported by 
competent, credible evidence. Murray v. Lyon 
(1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 215, 219. "The underlying 
rationale of giving deference to the findings of the 
trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial 
judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe 
their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and 
use these observations in weighing the credibility of 
the proffered testimony." Myers v. Garson (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 610, 615, quoting Seasons Coal Co. 
v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80. 
In their first assignment of error, appellants 
challenge the trial court's decision to order them to 
remove the two gates that are located at the ends of 
the right-of-way. The Supreme Court of Ohio has 
previously held that "[t]he owner of the servient 
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estate may use the land for any purpose that does 
not interfere with the easement, and, in the absence 
of anything in the deed, or in the circumstances 
under which it was acquired or used, showing that 
the way is to be an open one, he may put gates or 
bars across it, unless they would unreasonably 
interfere with its use" (Emphasis added.) Gibbons 
v. Ebding (1904), 70 Ohio St. 298, paragraph two 
of syllabus. Appellants argue that the trial court 
failed to properly follow the precedent established 
by Gibbons when it ordered the removal of the 
gates that had been erected by appellants. We 
disagree. 
*2 The trial court determined that the gates at the 
ends of the right-of- way unreasonably interfered 
with the Proffitts' use of the right-of-way. 
Specifically, the trial court found that "[t]o require a 
person to stop, open the gate, traverse the gate, get 
out and close the gate, upon each and every 
entrance and exit would appear to be an 
unreasonable burden in this particular situation." 
Moreover, the trial court found that the gate located 
at the top of the right-of-way "does constitute a 
hazard, or at the very least a significant problem, for 
those attempting to negotiate the left turn onto the 
Proffitts' property." 
The trial testimony of several witnesses 
demonstrated that the gates unreasonably burdened 
the use of the right-of-way. Michael Proffitt 
testified that after restrictive gates were erected at 
the ends of the right-of-way in 1998, he and his 
tenants began experiencing problems in driving 
farm equipment up the right-of-way. Several tenants 
of the Proffitts' land testified that it is a hazard to 
stop a tractor on the steep hillside and then to open 
the gate at the top of the right-of-way. One man 
who raised tobacco for the Proffitts testified that 
his tobacco cutter could not pass through the gate 
because it was too narrow. A man who boards 
horses at the Proffitts' farm testified that his trailer 
had once become stuck in one set of gates. In 
addition, a paramedic testified that he was unable to 
drive a life-squad vehicle up the right-of-way and 
through the narrow gates. 
We find that the trial court's determination that the 
erection of gates unreasonably interfered with the 
Proffitts' use of the right-of-way is supported by 
competent, credible evidence. The first assignment 
of error is overruled. 
Assignment of Error No. 2: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING 
THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
APPELLANTS, THE SERVIENT ESTATE 
OWNERS, TO BUILD A FENCE ALONG THE 
EAST SIDE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
EASEMENT IF THEY INTEND TO ENCLOSE 
LIVESTOCK FOR GRAZING PURPOSES. 
At trial, Michael Plymesser testified that he 
intended to graze animals that would have access to 
the right-of-way and would graze on the 
right-of-way. He testified that his farm already has 
some horses and that he plans on raising cattle. 
Several witnesses testified that it would be a hazard 
to allow animals to graze along the right-of-way, 
where farmers move loads of hay, tobacco, and 
other crops using large farming vehicles. One 
witness testified that it would be dangerous for both 
the driver and the animals. 
An owner of a servient estate may notexercise his 
rights in such a way as to unreasonably interfere 
with the special use for which the easement was 
created. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. Co. v. 
Wachter (1904), 70 Ohio St. 113, 118; Columbia 
Gas Transm. Corp. v. Bennett (1990), 71 Ohio 
App.3d 307, 319. Recognizing that appellants 
intended to graze livestock along the right-of-way 
and that the gates that had pieviously kept the 
livestock away from the right-of-way were to be 
removed, the trial court ordered appellants to build 
a fence along the right-of-way to enclose such 
livestock. The trial testimony indicates that allowing 
livestock to graze in the right-of-way would create a 
hazard that would be an unreasonable burden upon 
the use of the easement. Therefore, we overrule 
appellant's second assignment of error. 
*3 Assignment of Error No. 3: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANTS DID NOT 
ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF 
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLEES' 
USE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY SHOULD BE 
LIMITED IN ANY FASHION WHATSOEVER. 
The trial court denied appellants' fifth 
counterclaim, which alleges that the Proffitts1 use 
of the right-of-way should be limited in accordance 
with the original intent of the grantor. Appellants 
argue that the Proffitts should not be permitted to 
increase the physical dimensions of the 
right-of-way. Appellants argue that whereas the 
right-of-way was never intended to be "anything 
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more than a narrow farm path for agricultural 
ingress and egress," the Proffitts now want to 
"traverse it with huge, modern farm equipment." 
The testimony at trial established that tenants of the 
Proffitts' farm routinely accessed the Proffitts' 
land by using the right-of-way, and that the size of 
the machinery used to farm the land had increased 
over the years. 
In its decision and judgment entry, the trial court 
stated: 
The Court specifically orders that * * * fencing 
shall not interfere with farm equipment or 
machinery of the size regarding which Plaintiffs' 
tenants testified during this trial. The Court 
specifically recall [sic ] Scott Malott's four row 
setter as being a "big outfit." The Court does not 
believe that this right-of-way should be restricted 
to prevent such equipment or machinery. 
The grant of an easement is not made for present 
use alone but anticipates future use; for example, 
easements for ingress and egress, which were 
originally granted to allow horse-drawn vehicles, 
later provided the owner of the dominant estate the 
right to travel with automobiles and trucks, modern 
means of transportation. Realty Title & Investment 
Co. v. Fairport, Painesville & Eastern Rd. Co. 
(1919), 12 Ohio App. 73, 79. "[T]he exercise of the 
right is not to be confined to the modes in vogue 
when it was first acquired. The owner * * * may 
keep pace with the progress of invention and 
ingenuity, so far as is necessary to a profitable 
working of his property in competition with rivals." 
Id. at 80, quoting Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining 
Co., 55 N.Y. 538, 551. We find that the trial court 
correctly determined that the size of the modern 
farming equipment in use should be accommodated. 
Appellants further argue that the right-of-way is 
being used improperly for ingress and egress to 
property other than that specified at the easement's 
creation. Appellants claim that the original intent of 
the grant of the easement was to access a 
seventy-acre tract of land. Appellants assert that the 
seventy-acre tract is a part of the one hundred 
eighty-five acres of land currently owned by the 
Proffitts. Appellants reason that the right-of-way 
can be used only to access the seventy-acre tract of 
land. 
The Proffitts argue that appellants did not even 
demonstrate that there has been an additional use of 
the right-of-way. The Proffitts contend that the 
evidence presented at trial did not show that the 
farming activity on their land took place anywhere 
other than the original seventy-acre tract. However, 
the trial court assumed in its decision that the 
Proffitts were using the right-of-way to access 
additional acreage adjoining the seventy-acre tract. 
We defer to this factual finding by the trial court 
judge, who not only had the benefit of hearing the 
testimony from the trial but also visited the 
properties of the feuding parties. 
*4 Appellants insist that according to Berardi v. 
Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1965), 1 Ohio App.2d 365, 
this court should find that an easement can only be 
used in connection with the estate to which it is 
appurtenant and cannot be extended by the owner to 
any other property which he may then own or 
afterward acquire, unless this is provided for in the 
instrument in which the easement is created. We 
note that although the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals makes this general statement of law in 
Berardi, that court thereafter acknowledged that this 
issue had not been raised by the pleadings and was 
not before that court. Therefore, this statement of 
law is merely dicta. 
Nevertheless, we note that this statement of law 
from Berardi was adopted and followed by the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals in State ex rel Fisher v. 
McNutt (1992), 73 Ohio App.3d 403. In that case, 
the court determined that an easement appurtenant 
originally granted for access to approximately 
seventy acres of land could not be used to gain 
access for managing an adjoining forest that was 
nearly five thousand acres in size, where such use 
enhanced the burden of servient estate by sixty 
times. Id. at 408. Among the activities included in 
the proposed management of this forest were timber 
harvesting, mineral management, and recreation 
development. Id. at 405. In its analysis, the McNutt 
court initially acknowledged that upon examining 
the instrument that created the easement reasonable 
minds could only conclude that intentions of the 
original grantor and grantee of the easement were 
that the right-of-way would be used solely for 
ingress and egress to the original seventy acres. Id. 
The court also stated: 
Furthermore, the state's plan to use the 
right-of-way easement to conduct forest 
management on the entire 4,842.30 acres of land 
would enhance the burden on appellants' servient 
estate by sixty times. This certainly is an 
unreasonable increase in the burden to the 
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by the original grantor and grantee. 
In the case sub judice, appellants quote the 
original grant of easement from Brown County deed 
records, but this deed was not an exhibit at trial and 
is not part of the record before us. The current 
deeds to the land owned by the Proffitts and 
appellants were admitted into evidence at trial, but 
neither the Proffitts nor appellants owned their 
lands when the easement was created in 1924. 
Without the opportunity to examine the exact 
language used in the creation of the easement, we 
will not conclude, as did the McNutt court, that the 
intentions of the original grantor and grantee of the 
easement were that the right-of-way would be used 
only for ingress and egress of the adjoining 
seventy-acre lot. 
In this case, the Proffitts are using the right-of-way 
to access an additional one hundred fifteen acres of 
land. Appellants failed to show that the additional 
use of theright-of-way to access acreage beyond the 
seventy-acre tract placed an additional burden upon 
the servient estate. Although appellants complain 
about the farming vehicles that traversed the 
right-of-way, appellants did not show that there was 
any measurable increase in traffic on the right-of-
way due to traffic accessing acreage beyond the 
seventy-acre plat. See Centel Cable Television Co. 
of Ohio v. Cook (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 8, 12 
(holding that a new and additional use of an 
easement was permissible where it was similar to 
the use already granted and did not place an 
additional burden upon the servient estate). 
*5 After considering the evidence presented to the 
trial court, we find that the Proffitts' use of the 
right-of-way is not an unreasonable increase in the 
burden to the servient estate that could not have 
been intended by the original grantor and grantee. 
See McNutt, 73 Ohio App.3d at 408. Therefore, the 
trial court properly determined that the Proffitts1 
current use of the right-of-way need not be limited. 
The third assignment of error is overruled. 
Judgment affirmed. 
WALSH and POWELL, JJ., concur. 
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